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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. No. 16934 
DAVID M. BALLS and RICHARD S. 
JOHNS II, co-partners, dba 
UTAH EXCAVATING, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arnold disagrees with many of defendants' statements. In 
defendant's statement of facts, it is asserted (p.4) that Arnold 
was willing to have the rental continue beyond six months so long 
as payments were kept current. That is true, but it is not sig-
nificant, because all that was discussed insofar as having the 
lease extend beyond six months was extension for one or two 
months (T.266), not three years. 
Defendants point out (p. 4) that Arnold filed a financing 
statement. Arnold did so in order to protect its priority in the 
event the option was exercised, since a UCC-1 must be filed 
within ten days of delivery: 
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase 
money security interest before or within ten days 
after the debtor receives possession of the colla-
teral, he takes priority over the rights of a trans-
feree in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise be-
tween the time the security interest attaches and the 
time of filing. 70A-9-301(2). 
Because of the risk of loss of priority for failure to file, 
even though a security interest was not intended, the code was 
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amended to provide that filing is not a factor in determining 
whether or not a lease is intended as security. 
A consignor or lessor of goods may file a financing 
statement using the terms "consignor," "consignee," 
"lessor," "lessee" or the like instead of the terms 
specified in section 70A-9-402. The provisions of 
this part shall apply as appropriate to such a fi-
nancing statement but its filing shall not of itself 
be a factor in determining whether or not the con-
signment or lease is intended as security [section 
70A-l-201(37)]. However, if it is determined for 
other reasons that the consignment or lease is so 
intended, a security interest of the consignor or 
lessor which attaches to the consigned or leased goods 
is perfected by such filing. 70A-9-408. 
Thus, the filing of a financing statement is no indication as to 
whether there is a lease or a security interest. 
Defendants assert (p. 5) that attempts were made to get 1 
financing to enable them to exercise the option; but, before that 
could be done, Arnold entered into a lease with Salt Lake County. 
The evidence is to the contrary: 
Q. . .. When did you wish to exercise the option, at 
the end of the six months? 
A. We had intended to do that. However at the end 
of the six months we had not made six payments. 
We didn't feel like we could obtain the fin-
ancing at that time with the little amount that 
we had accrued, so we didn't even attempt to 
finance the machine at the end of six months. 
(Johns T.212) 
Q. All right. State what was said concerning 
termination, Arnold terminating? 
A. . .. He finally told me that he did not have the 
money. In his words, 'I guess I will have to 
forget it.' (Welch of Arnold T.318) 
Arnold acted reasonably in attempting to dispose of the property, 
by lease or sale, when the defendants indicated they couldn't 
finance it and would have to "forget it." 
2 
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Defendants point out (p. 5) that Arnold did not give them 
notice that it was entering into the lease with Salt Lake County 
or that it intended to dispose of the equipment, seemingly im-
plying that defendants were not aware that Arnold would re-lease 
or sell the equipment. The evidence is: 
A. The last conversation that I finally had with Mr. 
Balls, I told him it was subject to future rental 
and that we did have people looking to rent this 
machine. (Welch of Arnold T.318) 
Defendants assert (p.5) that it was stipulated between the 
parties that if defendants exercised their option to purchase, 
then the various amounts would have to be paid depending on the 
date selected. The stipulation was as to the correctness of 
computation, but that stipulation had nothing to do with any 
recognition that the option could be extended to any later dates 
after the six-month lease had terminated. 
Defendants assert (p.7) that their financial situation was 
not typical of the seventy-five to eighty percent of those enter-
ing into equipment leases with Arnold, who do not exercise their 
option to purchase. Defendants' financial situation was typical. 
Their inability to raise a down payment was one of the very 
reasons that a lease instead of a contract of sale was chosen by 
them. 
A. . .. And because of our financial condition, 
not having sufficient money to make a down 
payment and being aware that these kinds of 
alternatives were available, we elected to 
use that kind of an arrangement rather than 
have to come up with that much capital at 
that time in order to get the equipment to 
put it to use. (Johns of Utah Excavating 
T.195) 
3 
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Defendants assert (p. 7) that most of those who do not ex-
ercise the option have only a temporary need for the equipment 
and that there was no testimony from Mr. Balls or Mr. Johns that 
the reason for the lease was to give them time to determine 
whether their work would last. To the contrary, the other reason 
that a lease instead of a contract of sale was chosen by defen-
dants was that they only had work "more or less" committed. 
Q. What was that? 
A. That we were interested in obtaining a backhoe so 
that we could use it to perform work that we had 
more or less had committed to us if we had that 
type of equipment. (Johns of Utah Execavating 
T.169) 
A. . .. nor were they sure if the type of work they 
had was going to last for this two or three-year 
period. So in lieu of buying the piece of equip-
ment we then elected to rent it to them until 
they found out if the work was going to hold out. 
(Byerline of Arnold T. 110, 111) 
Defendants reiterate (p. 7) that they attempted to arrange 
financing right up until the time the equipment was leased to 
Salt Lake County. The evidence is to the contrary (supra p. 2). 
Defendants assert (p.8) that Mr. Johns did contemplate what 
the machine would be worth after six months, but had not made any 
calculations as to an exact figure. His testimony is not prop-
erly represented. He testified that he had no such anticipation: 
Q. Did you form an expectation as to what the equip-
ment, or an anticipation as to what the equip-
ment, would be worth after one year? 
A. No. I don't recall having done that. (T .190) 
Defendants assert (p. 8) that they did not terminate the 
lease, but attempted to arrange financing even after the equip-
ment was returned. As pointed out above, Mr. Johns testified, 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"We didn't even attempt to finance the machine at the end of six 
months. 11 (T. 212) and that they would have to 11 forget it." 
(T.318) 
Defendants assert (p.8) that the court did not state that it 
was a waste of its time to consider the intention of the parties 
as to when the option would be exercised. The court stated: 
MR. DIBBLEE: 
Well, I mean I didn't, I thought that that issue was 
more or less concluded and there wasn't any sense of 
wasting the Court's time. 
THE COURT: 
I think it really is myself ... 
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT POINT I. 
Defendants assert (p.8) that they had the option to acquire 
the equipment for no additional consideration and that, there-
fore, the lease was in tended as security. Their argument is 
based upon the construction of the provision in the written lease 
relating to the term of the lease. It is submitted that defen-
dants and the lower court erroneously concluded that Arnold could 
not terminate the lease at any time unless the defendants were in 
default and that the lease could thus run forever. By extending 
the term to whatever long enough period at which rentals would 
necessarily exceed the option price, obviously a point is reached 
at which no additional consideration would have to be paid. As 
pointed out in appellant's brief, such is not a reasonable con-
struction of the lease. The provisions for default relate to 
reasons for termination while the lease is in effect rather than 
being a limitation on the right to terminate. 
5 
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The construction of this written lease as made by the lower 
court is not binding upon this Supreme Court and, in fact, the 
lower court 1 s "views thereon are not indulged any special cred-
it• II This court said in Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk 7 U 2d 
163, 321 P2d 221, 223: 
Unless uncertainty opens the door to extraneous expla-
nation, the trial court is in no position of advantage 
in interpreting documents, and his views thereon are 
not indulged any special credit as are findings on 
issues of fact. 
As stated in SA CJS Appeal and Error, § 1660: 
Since the interpretation of a written instrument pre-
sents a question of law, however, a reviewing court is 
not bound by the conclusion of the trial court. Thus, 
the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's 
construction of unambiguous language of a written 
document, or by the construction of a written in-
strument based solely on the terms of the instrument, 
where no extrinsic evidence was introduced on the 
issue of its proper construction, or where the ev-
idence is without conflict and not susceptible of 
conflicting inferences, and if a finding is in con-
flict with an express provision of a written agreement 
of the parties, which is the controlling fact in the 
case, the finding will be disregarded by the appellate 
court. 
There was testimony as to extension of the lease term for a 
few months, but there was no evidence relating to whether or not 
the lease was perpetual insofar as the lessor was concerned other 
than the lease document itself. Consequently, it is the pre-
rogative of this court to properly construe the written instru-
ment. 
With a proper construction of the termination provision in 
the lease, the authorities cited by defendants in their Point I. 
are inapplicable. Furthermore, as pointed out in our Appellant's 
Brief, even if applicable their rationale is fallacious and 
should not be followed. 
6 
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DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT POINT II. 
Defendants argue that under the three tests set forth in 
FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, U 2d , 590 P2d 803 the 
lease was intended as security. 
Test 1. (Compare the option price with the original list 
price or the price of the property.) Obviously, when any lease 
term is infinitely extended, total lease payments will exceed the 
price of the property, and thus no additional consideration would 
have to be paid upon exercise of the option to acquire title. 
But when viewed as of the time the parties entered into the 
transaction, at which time they intended that the option, if 
exercised, would be exercised at the end of the six-month lease, 
payment of the substantial option price of $75,736.50 would have 
been necessary as compared with the $92,220 original value. That 
is not a nominal consideration. 
Test 2 (Compare the option price with "sensible alter-
natives. 11 ) Defendants argue that Arnold's salesman represented 
that Utah Excavating was building up an equity with each payment. 
It could have become an "equity" if defendants had work to do to 
utilize the machine at the end of the six months, and if defen-
dants could get financing at the end of six months, and if they 
then elected to convert the lease to a contract of purchase. At 
the time the lease was entered into, defendants were not sure 
that they had work, nor that they could finance it in the future. 
With either foresight or hindsight, as to need for the machine 
and as to ability to finance, there was a sensible alternative to 
the payment of an additional $75, 736. 50 in order to acquire a 
7 
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machine, which was, to begin with, worth $92,220 and which would 
have had an addi tiona1 six months' "wear and tear." That sen-
sible alternative was to not agree to buy it if it was then 
neither needed nor affordable. 
Test 3 (Compare the option price with the fair market value 
at the time the option is to be exercised.) Defendants again 
rely upon values and option prices at various dates beyond the 
intended lease period assuming that the option could be exercised 
at any time in perpetuity. Even if those values were relevant, 
defendants' estimates of value at the various times selected by 
them (p.17) are high, as shown by comparing their estimate for 
March 1979 of $81,000 with the $66,400 paid by Salt Lake County 
in March 1979 in an arms-length sale with competitive bidding. 
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT POINT III. 
Defendants argue that the trial court's "finding" that the 
agreement is intended as a security instrument should be sus-
tained. This is more a conclusion of law than it is a finding of 
fact, and it is based upon the trial court's construction of the 
equipment rental agreement that it could be terminated by Arnold 
only for cause and that, so far as defendants were concerned, it 
would continue in perpetuity and that the option could be exer-
cised at an infinite time in the future. 
As pointed out previously (supra ps. 5, 6), the construction 
of a written agreement by the lower court is not binding upon 
this court because interpretation of a written instrument pre-
sents a question of law. Ephraim Theater v. Hawk 7 U2d 163, 321 
P2d 221; SA CJS Appeal & Error §1660. A reasonable construction 
8 
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of the lease is that either party could terminate without cause 
after six months. If such a reasonable construction is given by 
this court, then the argument of defendants that the option could 
be exercised with the payment of no consideration at an infinite 
time in the future is inapplicable. The inescapable alternate 
conclusion is that a substantial consideration would have to have 
been paid at the time when the parties intended the option was to 
be exercised. 
Defendants argue (p. 21) that "the purpose of the equipment 
rental agreement was to enable Utah Excavating to acquire an 
equity in the excavator." That statement is misleading. A 
correct statement would be that "the purpose of the equipment 
rental agreement was to enable Utah Excavating to determine at a 
later date whether or not its jobs were such that it would need 
to purchase the excavator. In the meantime if rental payments 
were made during a sixth month period, Utah Excavating could 
then, if it desired, exercise its option to purchase the equip-
ment and then enter into a contract to purchase it, applying 
rental payments as a down payment." 
DEFENDANTS' POINT IV. 
Defendants assert that Arnold would not be entitled to re-
cover the unpaid rental payments because Arnold had not given 
written notice of the sale to Salt Lake County as required by the 
UCC for conditional sale repossessions. Defendants cite FMA as 
authority therefor. 
There are three possibilities with authorities for each 
position as to the effect of failing to comply with the require-
9 
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men ts of the code: (1) award damages to lessee, ( 2) bar any 
deficiency award to lessor, or ( 3) presume lessor has no defi· 
ciency. A Utah Law Review article summarizes these alternatives 
as follows: 
Section 9-507 (1) permits the debtor to recover from 
the secured party any loss caused by the secured 
party's failure to comply with the provisions of part 
5. Although the Code speaks no further on this issue, 
three distinct positions have emerged regarding the 
effect of a failure to notify the debtor upon the 
secured party's right to recover a deficiency. The 
first is the "sole remedy" rule which limits the 
debtor to the remedy that a strict reading of Section 
9-507 provides: 'the debtor can either bring a sepa-
rate action or assert a setoff or counterclaim in the 
deficiency suit to recover for the damages caused by 
the failure to notify.' Second is the 'no deficiency 
rule, ' which makes notice by the secured party a 
condition precedent to recovery of deficiency judg-
ment. Third is the 'Arkansas Rule, 1 under which a 
failure to notify does not result in a bar to a defi-
ciency judgment, but rather triggers a presumption 
that the collateral was worth at least the amount of 
the debt. The burden is then placed on the secured 
party to prove what would have been realized from a 
commercially reasonable sale. 
Utah Law Review, 1979 No. 3, 567, 573 Leases As Secu-
rity Agreements And The Effect of A Failure To Notify 
On A Secured Party's Recovery Of A Deficiency 
Judgment: FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers 
It is not clear from the FMA decision which of the three rules 
should apply if the lease here were, as a matter of law, a condi-
tional sale. This court said that FMA Financial Corp. "did not 
meet the burden of proving all aspects of the sale where commer-
cially reasonable." FMA Financial (supra at 807-808). This 
language indicates that the court was applying what was referred 
to above as the "Arkansas Rule," which does not bar recovery if 
it is shown that the sale was commercially reasonable and that 
the proceeds therefrom were insufficient to discharge the debt. 
Here the sale was to the county, a disinterested third party, and 
10 
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Arnold had every reason to sell at the highest price obtainable. 
There is nothing to show that, had notice been given any better 
or higher price, would have been obtained on the sale of the 
equipment. If this court had been adopting the "no deficiency 
rule" in FMA, it could have ended its analysis upon finding a 
failure to notify and would not have needed to discuss the fail-
ure to conduct a commercially reasonable sale. The fact that 
this court did discuss the failure to conduct a commercially 
reasonable sale suggests that it was leaning tward the "Arkansas 
Rule," under which commercial reasonableness becomes relevant 
once the failure to notify is established. Assuming that rule to 
be applicable, Arnold did show that it sold in a commercially 
reasonable manner to the county and realized $66 ,400 from such 
sale. If~ as a matter of law, there was a conditional sale 
instead of a lease, then the "amount of the debt" would be the 
option price of $92,220 plus the option charges of $17,291 (1\% 
per month for the fifteen months from the date of the contract to 
date of sale to the county) or a total of $109,511. Subtracting 
payments received: 
Defendant's rental payments 
Salt Lake County rental payment 
Salt Lake County purchase pay't 
Total Payments 
$ 17,095 
22,000 
66,400 
$105,495 
(Ex. D9) 
(T.97,142, 
Ex. DlO) 
( Ex . 6 , T . 12 7 ) 
the difference would be $4,016. Thus, even if the lower court's 
conclusion that a security interest was created were correct, 
Arnold would still be entitled to a $4,016 deficiency. 
Defendants argue (p.23) that "the law abhors a forfeiture" 
but theh misapplies the rule. The effect of the lower court's 
11 
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decision is to forfeit the lessor's right to rentals just because 
of a technical failure to give a notice of sale which it did not 
know it had to give because, understandably, it· thought it was 
·' dealing with a lease and not a sale. Writ ten notice would not ~, 
have changed matters, it inasmuch as defendants were already aware 
\1 that Arnold intended to dispose of the machine and defendants had 
stated they would have "to forget it because they did not have 
financing." (T.318) The notice, therefore, would have accom-
plished nothing. 
Defendants cite dollar figures (p.23) showing total amounts 
received from Arnold from all sources. Defendants failed in 
their analysis to recognize the fact that monthly short-term 
rental payments are usually higher than monthly long-term con-
tract payments because of the difference in overhead and depreci· 
ation. More importantly, defendants' analysis omits the 1~% per 
month option charge which according to the terms of the option 
must be added to the price of the equipment to cover that over· 
head, the principal item of which is interest on the funds tied 
up in the equipment. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was in error for the following reasons: 
1. It misconstrued the lease agreement as being in perpe-
tuity so long as rental payments were received insofar as the 
lessor was concerned, but being only for a six-month period and 
so long thereafter as lessee may desire it to continue insofar as 
the lessee was concerned. Construction of the written lease is a 
matter of law and this court should correct that misconstruction. 
When properly construed as being a six-monrh l ~':\CO ,... ... +-~ both 
12 
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parties, but to continue thereafter so long as both parties are 
in agreement that it should continue, the lower court's analysis 
fails. The point at which it is determined as to whether or not 
a substantial payment would remain to acquire title would then be 
at the end of six months, not at the ultimate time, which any 
lease in perpetuity would reach when the rental payments would 
exceed the initial value of the property. 
2. Written notice of the sale to the county was not given 
because the parties thought there was a lease and not a sale, and 
that therefore no notice was needed. Defendants were actually 
aware that Arnold was going to dispose of the equipment. They 
also had indicated they were giving up any claim to same. 
3. A sale would have been intended only if both parties 
were bound, Arnold to sell for the price and defendants to pay 
all or substantially all of same. Here, defendants were not 
bound to pay more than a small percentage of the price. The 
essential element of a sale, that both parties be bound, is 
lacking. 
4. Even if there were, as a matter of law, a security 
interest, the court assumed that because written notice of sale 
was not given, as provided by the Code, Arnold forfeited its 
claim. Defendants thereby obtained free use of the machine. 
Such should not be the case where the sale is shown to be reason-
able and where it is shown that nothing different would have 
occurred if notice had been given, which was shown here. There 
should be no forfeiture. 
13 
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5. The FMA decision is not controlling here because in FMA 
-
the les-see was bound to pay rentals during the full lease period 
of thirty-six months, and there then was truly only a nominal 
consideration left to be paid in order to capture the equipment. 
Here, the lessees were only bound to pay six months' rental at 
the end of which time they had the option to pay the substantial 
sum to purchase the equipment or to return the equipment without 
any obligation. 
The option price at the end of six months, or at the time 
the property was sold to the county, was a very substantial sum 
which in no way could be deemed ''nominal consideration." 
Respectfully submitted, 
John W. Lowe, Lowe & Associates 
~ttorney for Plaintiff 
J 
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